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Code Issues Releases Wiki Activity

make it clear its not a security boundray so nobody relies on it

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This commit is contained in:
J. Nick Koston
2026-02-06 16:02:24 +01:00
parent db92aca490
commit f660a62deb
1 changed files with 12 additions and 3 deletions
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15
esphome/bundle.py
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@@ -422,8 +422,11 @@ def extract_bundle(
) -> Path:
"""Extract a bundle archive and return the path to the config YAML.
Security: validates no path traversal, no symlinks, no absolute paths,
and enforces size limits.
Sanity checks reject path traversal, symlinks, absolute paths, and
oversized archives to prevent accidental file overwrites or extraction
outside the target directory. These are **not** a security boundary —
bundles are assumed to come from the user's own machine or a trusted
build pipeline.
Args:
bundle_path: Path to the .tar.gz bundle file.
@@ -535,7 +538,13 @@ def _read_manifest_from_tar(tar: tarfile.TarFile) -> dict[str, Any]:
def _validate_tar_members(tar: tarfile.TarFile, target_dir: Path) -> None:
"""Validate tar members for security issues."""
"""Sanity-check tar members to prevent mistakes and accidental overwrites.
This is not a security boundary — bundles are created locally or come
from a trusted build pipeline. The checks catch malformed archives
and common mistakes (stray absolute paths, ``..`` components) that
could silently overwrite unrelated files.
"""
total_size = 0
for member in tar.getmembers():